Why can’t Germany return to Russian energy while at the same time continuing to rely on the United States for its security?
That is a question the foreign-policy positions currently emerging inside the Alternative for Germany (AfD) have yet to answer.
Evidence base: Bundestag records and parliamentary motions, public statements by AfD foreign-policy figures, Reuters reporting and relevant German press coverage, all reviewed by Project Truth International.
Germany’s two dependency debates
For decades, Germany’s economic and security model rested on two important external pillars.
Large volumes of relatively cheap energy came from Russia.
At the same time, a significant part of Germany’s military security was embedded in NATO and, above all, depended on the capabilities and extended deterrence provided by the United States.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 fundamentally disrupted the first relationship. Germany’s dependence on Russian pipeline gas collapsed as energy ties with Moscow were sharply reduced.
The second dependency — reliance on the United States for military security — has increasingly become the subject of political debate.
The AfD now challenges significant parts of both arrangements.
On September 11, 2026, the AfD parliamentary group submitted a Bundestag motion calling on the federal government to lift all “energy-related sanctions, embargoes and other restrictions”, arguing that high energy prices, declining industrial production, job losses and worsening competitiveness required urgent action.
Separately, Reuters reported on September 18 that AfD co-leaders Alice Weidel and Tino Chrupalla were preparing for possible talks in 2027 with Kirill Dmitriev, President Vladimir Putin’s senior economic envoy and head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund, about a potential revival of Russian gas supplies to Germany. No agreement has been announced, and neither the AfD nor Dmitriev’s representatives commented on the reported plans.
At the same time, another senior AfD figure has publicly warned that Germany is not yet capable of replacing the American security umbrella.
Beatrix von Storch, deputy chair of the AfD parliamentary group, a member of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee and deputy chair of the parliament’s USA group, has argued that Germany currently lacks the military and nuclear capabilities required for an uncoordinated withdrawal of U.S. forces.
Taken together, these positions raise a larger question:
What would German strategic sovereignty actually look like under the foreign-policy positions currently being debated inside the AfD?
Von Storch’s warning: Germany cannot yet replace America
The disagreement became unusually explicit in spring 2026.
AfD co-leader Tino Chrupalla publicly called for U.S. troops to leave Germany.
Beatrix von Storch pushed back.
She noted that the AfD’s own programme supports the withdrawal of foreign troops, but makes that goal conditional on Germany becoming fully capable of defending itself and fulfilling its obligations within NATO.
Germany, she argued, has not yet reached that point.
The most difficult issue is nuclear deterrence.
Von Storch warned that Germany has no independent nuclear arsenal and remains dependent on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Without full defence capability and close coordination with allies, she argued, a premature reduction in the American military presence could leave Germany exposed.
Her position is therefore essentially strategic rather than ideological.
Germany may seek greater sovereignty, but reducing the foreign military presence would first require Germany — or Europe — to replace the capabilities currently provided through the existing alliance structure.
That means conventional forces, air and missile defence, intelligence, logistics, command infrastructure and, ultimately, a credible answer to nuclear deterrence.
Von Storch’s own statements acknowledge that Germany does not currently possess all of those capabilities independently.
Energy policy is moving in the opposite direction
The AfD’s energy policy points in another direction.
On September 11, 2026, the parliamentary group formally called for all energy-related sanctions, embargoes and restrictions to be lifted.
The motion argues that persistently high energy prices are damaging German industry, contributing to lower production, job losses and reduced competitiveness.
That argument has considerable political relevance in 2026.
European gas storage stood at around 69% of capacity in mid-September, compared with a five-year seasonal average of approximately 85%. Germany and the Netherlands, which together account for a large share of EU storage capacity, were among the countries facing particular pressure from high energy prices and slower restocking.
The economic pressure is real.
But there is a second question.
Reducing dependence on expensive global LNG is one policy objective.
Returning to large-scale dependence on Russian pipeline gas is another.
They are not necessarily the same policy.
Reuters: talks about bringing Russian gas back
Reuters reported on September 18 that Kirill Dmitriev, Putin’s senior economic envoy and head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund, and AfD leaders Alice Weidel and Tino Chrupalla were preparing for a possible meeting in 2027 to discuss restoring Russian gas supplies to Germany.
According to Reuters’ sources, the proposed talks could also address the future of the Nord Stream infrastructure.
Several qualifications are essential.
No agreement has been announced.
The meeting described by Reuters is prospective.
No evidence has been presented that such talks have already taken place.
Neither the AfD nor Dmitriev’s representatives commented on the report.
Beatrix von Storch was not identified by Reuters as a participant in the planned discussions.
These distinctions matter.
A reported plan for talks is not evidence that an agreement has been reached.
But the report does move the issue beyond a purely theoretical Bundestag debate. It indicates that senior AfD figures and a senior Russian economic representative are considering discussions about restoring energy relations between Germany and Russia.
A few days later, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov publicly linked the AfD’s electoral success to Germany’s loss of cheap Russian gas.
Peskov argued that Germany’s shift away from Russian energy had damaged the country’s competitiveness and increased economic dissatisfaction. Reuters noted that the Kremlin’s remarks came against the background of the reported plans for discussions between AfD leaders and Dmitriev.
That does not establish coordination between the Kremlin and the AfD.
It does show how Moscow publicly interprets Germany’s current economic difficulties and the political rise of the party.
That distinction is equally important.
The contradiction is not simply “pro-Russia versus pro-America”
It would be misleading to frame the issue simply as a conflict between a “pro-Russia” and a “pro-America” wing of the AfD.
The deeper issue is structural.
The party increasingly argues that German national sovereignty should be less constrained by decisions taken by existing allies.
But different AfD figures disagree over how quickly Germany can move in that direction and what should replace the current arrangements.
Von Storch’s statements expose the difficulty.
Removing or significantly reducing the American security presence raises an immediate question:
Who would replace the military and nuclear deterrence Germany currently receives through NATO and the United States?
Re-establishing large-scale energy relations with Russia raises another:
Would Germany be rebuilding a dependency on Russian infrastructure that proved politically vulnerable after relations with Moscow collapsed?
Trade with Russia and close relations with the United States are not mutually exclusive.
Many countries maintain economic links with one power while relying on security relations with another.
The real issue is not contact.
It is dependency.
Germany has already tested the Russian-energy model
Before 2022, Germany imported large quantities of relatively cheap Russian pipeline gas, helping support an industrial model built in part around access to lower-cost energy.
That arrangement benefited important sectors of German industry.
It also created strategic exposure.
When energy relations with Russia broke down after the invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent collapse of Russian pipeline supplies, Germany was forced to replace huge volumes of gas within a short period.
The resulting economic costs became a major political issue.
Supporters of restoring Russian energy ties argue that German industry should not be forced to reject cheaper energy when alternative supplies are more expensive.
Their argument is straightforward: if Russian gas can again be purchased cheaply and in sufficient quantities, refusing it for political reasons imposes unnecessary costs on industry and consumers.
Critics argue that the crisis demonstrated precisely why Germany should avoid rebuilding a large dependency on one politically unstable supply relationship.
Both sides are debating price.
But strategic policy requires another question:
What happens if the political relationship deteriorates again?
The American dependency is more difficult to replace
Energy supplies can, at least in principle, be diversified.
Military deterrence is harder to replace.
Germany can obtain LNG from different suppliers, alter its energy mix, expand infrastructure, reconsider nuclear power or reduce consumption.
Replacing the military role of the United States requires fundamentally different resources.
It requires armed forces.
Weapons.
Air and missile defence.
Intelligence capabilities.
Command infrastructure.
Logistics.
And, ultimately, a credible system of nuclear deterrence.
Germany and France are already discussing stronger European deterrence capabilities, but the German government continues to state that those efforts are intended to complement rather than replace NATO’s nuclear deterrence and the U.S. extended deterrent.
Von Storch’s comments recognise the same underlying reality.
Her position does not rule out a smaller American military role in Germany in the future.
It argues that such a reduction would have to follow — not precede — the creation of credible German or European alternatives.
That produces an important internal tension inside a party that repeatedly presents sovereignty as a central political objective.
The disagreement is not necessarily about the destination.
It is about whether Germany is already capable of getting there.
Ukraine sits at the centre of both debates
Russia’s war against Ukraine connects the energy and security questions.
Energy sanctions are not purely economic measures. They form part of the wider Western response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
At the same time, NATO’s renewed emphasis on deterrence is closely connected to Russia’s military actions in Europe.
Lifting energy-related sanctions therefore has consequences beyond the price of gas.
Reducing German reliance on NATO and the United States would also have consequences beyond bilateral relations with Washington.
The two policies interact.
Germany could attempt to reduce its military dependence on the United States while simultaneously restoring significant economic dependence on Russian energy.
Alternatively, it could pursue another model of sovereignty: building stronger independent defence capabilities while maintaining a more diversified energy system.
Those are not the same strategic model.
A Germany that distances itself from NATO while rebuilding dependence on Russian energy infrastructure would be structurally different from a Germany that reduces dependence on both Washington and Moscow by strengthening its own military capabilities and diversifying its energy supplies.
What the evidence establishes
The public record supports several conclusions.
First, Beatrix von Storch has publicly argued that Germany is not currently capable of replacing the American and NATO security framework without first developing significantly greater independent defence capabilities, including an answer to nuclear deterrence.
Second, the AfD parliamentary group has formally called for the removal of all energy-related sanctions, embargoes and other restrictions.
Third, Reuters has reported that Alice Weidel and Tino Chrupalla are preparing for possible talks in 2027 with Kirill Dmitriev about restoring Russian gas supplies to Germany. No evidence has been presented that such talks have already taken place or produced an agreement.
Fourth, the Kremlin has publicly linked Germany’s economic and energy difficulties to the loss of cheap Russian gas and has portrayed the AfD’s electoral rise as partly reflecting dissatisfaction with that change.
Together, these facts document an emerging strategic debate.
They do not establish that the AfD operates under Russian direction.
They do not establish a secret agreement between Russia and the party.
They do not show that Beatrix von Storch is involved in the reported discussions with Dmitriev.
And disagreement inside the AfD over U.S. troops does not itself prove hidden ties to a foreign state.
It demonstrates an internal political conflict over how the party’s concept of German sovereignty would work in practice.
Those limits are important.
The question the AfD still has to answer
The AfD’s positions on the relationships Germany should change are becoming clearer.
Sanctions.
Russian energy.
American troops.
NATO dependence.
Support for Ukraine.
The unresolved question is how those positions fit together.
Cheap Russian gas could reduce energy costs.
Reducing the American military presence could increase Germany’s formal autonomy.
Reducing Germany’s involvement in the conflict surrounding Ukraine could also lower some immediate political and financial commitments.
But reducing one external dependency while increasing another would not necessarily produce strategic independence.
The disagreement between von Storch and Chrupalla therefore involves more than an ordinary internal party dispute.
It exposes the central problem.
A state does not become strategically independent simply by ending a relationship.
It becomes independent when it has credible alternatives.
The open question for Germany is therefore not simply whether Washington or Moscow should play a smaller role.
It is whether Germany already possesses the military capabilities, energy alternatives and economic resilience required to reduce both dependencies — or whether those capabilities still have to be built.
Methodology and source note
This analysis was compiled by Project Truth International from open-source material, including German Bundestag documents, official parliamentary biographies, public statements by AfD politicians, Reuters reporting and German press coverage.
The article distinguishes between documented parliamentary positions, direct public statements and reporting based on unnamed sources.
Reuters reported that AfD leaders Alice Weidel and Tino Chrupalla and Russian economic envoy Kirill Dmitriev were preparing for possible talks in 2027 about restoring Russian gas supplies to Germany. At the time of publication, there was no evidence that such a meeting had already taken place or that any agreement had been reached.
Beatrix von Storch was not identified by Reuters as a participant in those reported talks.
This article also draws in part on earlier reporting by Klarfocus.de. Project Truth International independently reviewed the underlying source material and supplemented it with current reporting before publication.
Sources
- Reuters — Putin envoy and AfD prepare talks on restoring Russian gas supplies, September 18, 2026
- Reuters — Europe’s low gas stocks increase economic and political pressure, September 17, 2026
- Reuters — Kremlin comments on the AfD and dialogue with Russia, September 22, 2026
- German Bundestag — AfD motion calling for sanctions to be lifted, September 11, 2026
- German Bundestag — Official biography of Beatrix von Storch
- Federal Government of Germany — Joint declaration on European and NATO nuclear deterrence, March 2, 2026
- WELT — Von Storch criticises Chrupalla’s call for the withdrawal of U.S. troops
- Wikimedia Commons — Image source and CC BY 4.0 licence
